Abstract. Enterprise marketing networks has evolved into complex marketing networks from chain of marketing channel. However, current enterprise marketing networks has studied more limited to game decision-making of the single channel between upstream and downstream members. To considering the marketing channels of enterprise marketing networks has complex competitive relationship, the article has build the enterprise network marketing value equilibrium model, and has studied the different marketing channels of static game decision-making and under asymmetric information and cost game decision making.The article has from an example to explain the model of economic significance.
Introduction
The investigative of enterprise marketing networks is limited a single marketing channels upstream and downstream members decision-making, which studies can be seen as a single marketing channel upstream and downstream enterprises channels Game-making [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] .The existing examination about enterprise marketing networks has no studied decision-making of across the single marketing channel. As market competition intensifies, the single marketing channel interrelated and intertwined to form a complex marketing network in order to meet the needs of the end customer and get to maximize their own interests. There are variety of competing relationship in enterprise marketing networks, and game theory as an analysis tools are widely to use [6] . Competition and cooperation relationship of enterprise marketing networks are around value creation and value-added. For most enterprise marketing networks, value-added and network surplus is strong positive relationship.The revenue surplus is total profits for the marketing networks all the links shared, which from the difference between the sales revenue and the total cost of enterprise marketing networks sale of the marketing network marketing networks. 
The static game decision-making between different marketing channels
V  International Conference on Education, Management, Commerce and Society (EMCS 2015) Assume that two single marketing channel A MC and B MC in the process of market competition, which pursuit of their own value-added to maximize, the objective function is: Q when achieve their own value-added maximize. Which is equal to seek the first order derivative and second derivative of the formula (3), and satisfies:
Because the formula (5) is always established when A  is positive. Can be obtained from the formula (4):
Similarly can be obtained a single marketing channel B MC its product sales quantity when it achieve their own added value maximization:
Formula (6) and (7) simultaneous, respectively to obtain the two marketing channels 
MC
product sales quantity when maximized their own value-added as follows:
A MC and B MC product sales price when realize the maximized value added as follows:
A MC and B MC respect profits when achieve added value maximized as follow: (8) and (9) we can see that the best product sales of single marketing channel is not only associated with its own costs, but also relate to the cost of other marketing channels (competitors). The single marketing channel greater value-added is that has highest price of in the market and lower own costs and competitors (other marketing channels) higher cost. For example, the member of enterprise marketing networks strengthen information sharing, and implement dynamic order to reduce cost of marketing channels [7, 8] . 
Game decision-making of different marketing channels under asymmetric information
To seek the formula (13) for B Q the first derivative and the second derivatives, and to let the first derivative equal zero, and the second derivative is less than 0, then:
Because the formula (15) 
A MC and B MC sales respectively as follow, in the case of game behavior and achieve value-added maximum: These results suggest that in the case of asymmetric information costs optimal product sales decisions and optimal value-added are consistent with complete information costs.Marketing channels A MC optimal product sales decisions and optimal value-added with incomplete information different cost information disclosure.Which not only by impact of cost factors, and also depends on forecast competitors cost accuracy. 
The maximum sales price of product on the market is 150 a 
.Each a unit of product additional sale to drop price is 0.1 b  .The probability of marketing channels B MC with high cost for product marketing is uncertainty.We comparative analysis 0.2 p  and 0.6 p  both cases. Table 1 
Conclusion
If have incomplete cost information marketing channel is not using the expected value prediction of the other costs, only in the accurately predict each other's cost, to obtain the highest value; otherwise, not only will suffer due to inaccurate prediction of low value, and make the other side enjoy market price and relatively high added value.When the full cost information marketing channels the cost is lower than the other side, hope the other party can understand their cost information, this can be avoided because of the other prediction errors and the decision error caused by market prices, and avoid the loss of value added value.
